The evacuation of the fishing vessel Villa de Pitanxo highlights severe safety oversights, as an investigation revealed that the lifeboat on the port side was poorly released due to inadequate crew training. This incident underscores the critical nature of conducting regular evacuation drills to ensure crew members are well-prepared for emergency situations at sea.
The final report from the Commission for Maritime Accident and Incident Investigation (Ciaim) concluded that essential evacuation exercises were not performed, significantly limiting the crew”s chances of survival. It was discovered that while the port-side lifeboat was manually lowered from the deck, insufficient training prevented the crew from boarding it, leaving it empty and vulnerable to being swept away by the wind.
The three survivors of the Pitanxo—Juan Padin, Eduardo Rial, and Samuel Koufie—were found on the starboard lifeboat, which had sustained damage. Most of the deceased were reportedly tied to the lifeboat by the two survivors as they succumbed to hypothermia, attempting to avoid being carried away by the current. The line connecting the lifeboat to the vessel was cut with a knife or a blade close to the lifeboat, indicating that the cut was made while still on the inflatable craft, consistent with established protocols.
The report emphasized that if the line had been severed from the sinking vessel before jumping into the water, it could have led to the lifeboat drifting away, which indeed occurred in this case. According to Ciaim technicians, the analysis of the lines revealed that, in both instances, the cut was made under tension, confirming that the lifeboat was deployed by the crew. The cutting of the line was a clear indication of improper procedures, as the lifeboat had six meters of line remaining after the cut, suggesting it should have been cut from the vessel after the lifeboat was already in the water.
The investigation pointed to a lack of training among the crew, who should not have severed the line from the ship, likely resulting in the lifeboat being carried away by the wind, making it impossible for them to board it. The correct procedure would have involved securing the lifeboat to the Pitanxo when lowering it, jumping into the water, and then cutting the line to separate the lifeboat from the sinking vessel.
After the rescue of the survivors and the recovery of the nine bodies, both lifeboats were retrieved from the water. They were not sent from Canada to Spain; instead, they were delivered to the Guardia Civil by the fishing vessel Playa Menduiña Dos. The investigation found no survival supplies—such as water, food, or thermal aids—in either lifeboat, which Ciaim attributed to their probable removal sometime between the rescue operation and their handover to the authorities. Consequently, it remains unclear whether the crew had access to thermal aids, with only Padin reportedly wearing a survival suit and life vest.
Additionally, the Pitanxo was supposed to carry a “rescue boat” on the starboard side. However, the Ciaim indicated that it had a semi-rigid boat, specifically a Valiant V-520, which was not certified as a rescue boat. No exemption certificate regarding the rescue boat had been issued for the vessel.
